Theories on Somali
piracy often focus on the criminality of piracy practice. Instead of being
concerned about the believability of Somali ‘coast guard’ narratives, Christian
Bueger’s argues that, “we can treat the narrative as meaningful fiction which
gives coherence to the practice of piracy.” (1824) This allows us to
investigate Somali piracy practices against the Al Shabab terrorist
organization and evaluate their relationship with one another. Illuminating
this link may offer potential solutions for both Somali piracy and Somali
terrorism.
Firstly,
it is important to address fundamental ideological differences between the Al
Shabab terrorist organization and Somali pirates. The economic gains for Somali
pirates are contingent upon their behavior, with pay deductions for mistreating
the crew or even the 18th-century rule that “anyone who ‘meddled’
with a woman without her consent ‘shall suffer present death’.” (Phillips) The
Al Shabab are known for stoning women accused of adultery to death (BBC). The
Somali pirates self-proclaimed sole motivation is the protection from hunger
(Genttleman), whereas the Al Shabab have more complex religious-political aims.
The pirates appear to have a moral code against the harm to innocent people
according to their spokesperson. “Killing is not in our plans. We don’t want to
do anything more than hijacking… If you hold hostage innocent people, that’s a
crime. If you hold hostage people that are doing illegal activities, like waste
dumping or fishing, that is not a crime.” (Genttleman) There is a stark
contrast between this and the terrorist practices of the Al Shabab, who are
known for their suicide-bomber attacks and kidnappings across the border in
Kenya (BBC). Finally, the general population of pirates and terrorists represent
two factions of African Islamic groups, with the pirates being primarily Sufis
and the terrorists practicing the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam.
Finally, the pirates claim, whether believably or not, to be interested in the
protection of their people and seas, serving as a ‘Coast Guard’ against foreign
forces. Although the Al Shabab gained Somali support by promising security for
the people in 2011, they lost credibility when they rejected Western food aid
during a period of drought and famine (BBC). Furthermore, this exposed their
disinterest in the actual prosperity of Somali populations.
There has ben a
rapid decline in Somali piracy activities since 2013. Many different theories
have been presented as explanations, however, Currun Singh offers an
enlightening connection in the International
New York Times between the rise of Al Shabab and the decline of piracy.
“The most likely reason for the decline in piracy is that the Kenyan and
Ethiopian war against Al Shabab, the deadliest terrorist organization in East
Africa, has disturbed the patronage networks and business conditions along the
Somali coast that have enabled pirates to operate.” (Singh) Studies show that
piracy, like other illicit businesses, need stable conditions to prosper. According
to Singh, there have been isolated attempts at cooperation between pirates and
terrorists, but ultimately, the “Islamists” [Al Shabab] are serious about
putting an end to piracy. Singh’s research shows that counterterrorist and
counter-piracy attempts by the West have only had the opposite effect, yet “the
same militant Islamists that the Bush administration had targeted in the war on
terror joined the war on piracy – and did a better job of it.” However, now
that Al Shabab is in retreat, the emerging power vacuum in Somalia’s southern
ports may lead to conditions for pirates to resurface.
Now it is crucial
to address the proclaimed – whether true or false – interests of the Somali
pirates. Bueger presents the “simple logic” that the main solution to piracy is
to establish effective coast guards. “Pirates have explicitly made this offer,
claiming that they would disengage from piracy, if they could get employment in
an official government-sponsored coastguard.” (1822) Institutionalizing the
practice of piracy can essentially validate all of their claims of national
defense, environmental protection, and subsistence intentions. It will also
allow for a unified, legitimate force for the eradication of terrorist forces
in Somalia and future threats to national security.
Bueger, Christian. (2013) "Practice, Pirates and Coast Guards: the grand narrative of Somali piracy", Third World Quarterly, 34:10, 1811-1827.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. Q&A With a Pirate: "We Just Want the Money". September 30, 2008. The New York Times News Blog.
The Economist. "Somali piracy: more sophisticated than you thought" Nov. 2, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21588942-new-study-reveals-how-somali-piracy-financed-more-sophisticated-you
BBC. "Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?" May 16, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689
Singh, Currun. "Al Shabab Fights the Pirates." International New York Times. October 22, 2013.
Interesting post, Susan. I liked your comparison between Al-Shabab and the Somali pirates, a connection I had not considered before. Although you've claimed that whether or not the pirates' narrative is true is not the priority...wouldn't the believability of their narrative inform the policy solution to piracy? If it is true that they are solely concerned about their hunger and the survival of their fish stocks, then perhaps granting them powers as official coast guards would work. Yet if in actuality this narrative is just a cover for their profit seeking initiatives, then granting them official power as coast guards would actually exacerbate the problem, legitimizing a group of people who will now have the power to attack ships for profit.
ReplyDeleteSusan,
ReplyDeleteWhat are your personal views on piracy and how it impacts the wellbeing of a developing nation?